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Armed Movements and Counterinsurgency in Contemporary Mexico 
 
Pierre Gaussens  




Based on a case study, this article seeks to analyze the contemporary evolution of the armed movements in 
the southern Mexican state of Guerrero and the counterinsurgency operations they have faced. To reach this 
goal, the object of the qualitative methodology is the local history of a municipality, Ayutla de los Libres, 
from 1998 to 2013, describing the socio-political processes that were developed there and that separate 
both dates, each marked by a critical episode of repression. The main result is that, although the field of 
armed movements underwent great changes, moving from offensive to defensive forms, the 
counterinsurgency used against them shows strong continuities focused on repression. 
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According to Mexican historian Edmundo O’Gorman (2015: 29), “the decantation of historical judgment 
has highlighted Ayutla as a luminous sign in the landscape of our past. It is a rebellion, yes; but it is the 
eponymous rebellion, it is said, that marks the border between the shadows and the historical days of 
Mexico.” These words about the Ayutla Revolution of the mid-nineteenth century also serve to introduce the 
subject of this text, despite its contemporary nature. Indeed, although Ayutla has gone down in history for 
the eponymous plan that ended the dictatorship of Santa Anna, in recent years the inhabitants of this little 
municipality, in the southern state of Guerrero, have made the country remember its name, showing that the 
light of their rebellion lives on. In 1998, a new guerrilla was born there. In 2013, the armed uprising of self-
defense groups took place there. In 2018, for the first time in local legal history, an assembly was elected as 
the new municipal government, without party or president. 
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It is a part of these recent processes that I seek to study in this article, taking as a matter of analysis the 
period of the political history of the Ayutla municipality that runs from 1998 to 2013. The construction of the 
object of study responds to several selection criteria that help delimitate it and give it relevance. First, the 
municipality has suffered critical episodes of repression on these two dates, 1998 and 2013, through military 
interventions motivated by counterinsurgency purposes, in response to the presence of armed groups. 
Second, the two localities where these events occurred—El Charco and El Paraíso—are Mixtec indigenous 
communities; they belong to the same cultural zone, which makes them two comparable entities that share a 
political culture, since they have a common history in their development as neighboring rural communities. 
Third, the 15-year distance that separates both episodes is ideal to observe as variables of analysis the 
variations of qualitative order that political processes show at the municipal level. Finally, beyond its 
singularity as an empirical case, as in the era studied by O'Gorman, I think that the history of Ayutla is still 
representative of its time and its regional context, the state of Guerrero. Therefore, analyzing it can lead to a 
better understanding of the contemporary evolution of the armed movements in southern Mexico in relation 
to the counterinsurgency strategies they face. 
To achieve this objective, the article takes the perspective of social movement theory on political violence 
(Bosi, Della Porta and Malthaner 2019), based on a relational approach that understands this type of violence 
not in isolation, focusing only on armed groups, but in relation to the broader field of social movements to 
which they are connected, as well as to their political opponents, the State institutions, and the dynamics of 
contention between them (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). From this theoretical perspective, I want to 
observe in particular the relationship between political violence and repression (Della Porta 2014), as applied 
to the case study, between the armed movements present in Guerrero and the counterinsurgency they face.
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At this point, there is a consensus in the specialized literature to point out that the effects of repression on 
social mobilization are varied and may be positive or negative depending on how the relations between State 
institutions and mobilized groups are configured.  
However, most studies have focused on the positive effects that persistent repression can have, by 
producing processes of escalation and radicalization (Alimi, Bosi and Demetriou 2015). This paper seeks to 
contribute to the study of the opposite effect, when political violence decreases despite sustained levels of 
repression, with the emergence of new forms of conflict, collective identity or social organization, due to 
adaptation in its dynamic relationship with the State. In this sense, the idea that I defend here is that the 
permanence of repressive patterns over time, in a negative way, forces the mobilization to transform itself in 
order to adapt, by taking forms that give it a greater capacity to resist in the face of repression. I will try to 
illustrate this idea through the case of the field of armed movements in Guerrero and its transition from 
offensive to defensive forms, that is, from the guerrilla to community defense. 
Therefore, this work is based on a qualitative methodology. The secondary source for the results is 
substantial bibliographic research and a review of the local press. The primary source are the notes of a field 
diary written over several years—between 2012 and 2018—while participating in social work activities in 
various municipalities of Guerrero, from a privileged position as a university professor, which has allowed 
for numerous observation practices—often with participation—using ethnographic tools. In the municipality 
of Ayutla in particular, this work was carried out in two periods: between 2012 and 2013 as a local professor, 
and between 2017 and 2018 making a documentary on the municipal electoral process.  
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 Following Kilcullen (2010), counterinsurgency is an umbrella term that includes the set of measures that governments take 
to defeat an insurgency, that is, any political-military movement that struggles to conquer State power against the established 








It is important to note, however, that the most difficult issue to be investigated in Guerrero is precisely the 
question of the guerrillas—more than crime—, which is a real taboo due to its danger. Doing ethnography on 
the subject is extremely difficult because it requires very high levels of trust. As a local researcher 
acknowledges, the existence of guerrillas “has a veil of taboo and secrecy. The subject is not discussed 
openly except in private with trusted family and friends” (Berber, 2017: 123). Therefore, on several 
occasions my interlocutors refused to speak about it or declared not knowing anything. Of all the interviews 
that I have conducted with key actors in municipal politics and local history, over several years of fieldwork, 
only in five of them has the issue been addressed, and in three substantively. Of these last three, one was 
with a former guerrilla fighter, another with a sympathizer, and the last with a survivor of the Charco 
massacre. Meanwhile, the rest of the primary information on the guerrillas has been obtained outside of 
interviews, in informal conversations and in different places, often late at night. 
Finally, this article is part of a broader research project on the historical genesis of the self-defense armed 
groups that emerged in early 2013 in the Costa Chica region. It represents a systematization effort that seeks 
to add to the general study of the armed forces in Mexico through a contribution—certainly modest—related 
to the contemporary evolution of the armed movements in Guerrero, and understood as an invitation for 
future and substantive investigations in the matter. To reach its conclusions—which will take stock of the 
changes and continuities of these movements—the article is divided into seven sections: 1) a succinct 
presentation of the municipality of Ayutla; 2) the resurgence of the guerrillas in the 1990s; 3) the Charco 
massacre; 4) the change from guerrillas to the Community Police; 5) the creation of a House of Justice in El 
Paraíso; 6) the subsequent assault it suffered to be dismantled; and, 7) conclusions on the results obtained 
from the analysis. 
 
1. The Municipality of Ayutla de los Libres  
 
Ayutla is one of the municipalities that make up the Costa Chica region in the southern Mexican state of 
Guerrero. Despite being considered a coastal municipality, it does not have an exit to the sea, but to the north 
it borders the mountain region. Due to this position, Ayutla shares with other neighboring municipalities a 
condition that places it in a subregion known as Costa-Montaña, as a natural and cultural border between 
both regions. It is the most populated municipality in the Costa Chica region, as well as the ninth 
municipality with the largest population in Guerrero with a total of almost 70,000 inhabitants as of 2015, 
divided between the main city of Ayutla and some one hundred rural localities, most with fewer than 500 
inhabitants. Like the rest of the region, Ayutla is an eminently rural municipality. In 2014, 70% of its 
population was dedicated to the agricultural sector.  
The biodiversity and natural wealth of the area, which make a variety of production systems possible, 
contrasts with the high levels of marginalization: 88% of the population lives in poverty and 56% in extreme 
poverty. Likewise, during the study period, half of the municipal population lacked access to food, 60% to 
living spaces and quality, and 80% to basic services (CONEVAL 2010). In education, 25% of the adult 
population was illiterate and 40% had not completed primary school (CONAPO 2010). In general, with the 
exception of access to health services—due to the existence of a hospital in the main city—indicators of 
social deprivation are systematically above national and state averages, illustrating the severity of the poverty 
that affects the majority of the municipality's population. 
Part of this general condition of poverty is due to the geographical isolation that the municipality has 
historically suffered, since it occupies a border position in the regional geography in which the physical 








population recognizes itself as indigenous (INEGI 2015), either Mixtec (na savi) or Tlapanec (me'phaa), who 
live in the numerous localities of the mountainous parts of the municipality, isolated by the topography and 
connected to each other by paths and gaps. Proof of this isolation is the 55% rate of monolingualism of the 
inhabitants of the municipality's indigenous communities as of the year 2000 (Del Val and Cruz 2009: 549). 
In turn, these same localities are the most affected by conditions of marginalization, including El Charco and 
El Paraíso, both communities with very high rates of poverty. 
On top of these differences between segregated, overlapping and interrelated social spaces, there is 
another conflict, economic in nature, resulting from historical processes of polarization between the group of 
peasant families on the one hand, and the factions of the local ruling class on the other. The latter’s power is 
concentrated in the main city around the town hall, which separates the city of Ayutla from its annexed 
localities. In short, like most rural municipalities in the region, the structure of Ayutla’s local society is 
characterized by a general condition of poverty exacerbated by a set of antagonisms whose main axis 
opposes poor peasant communities, mostly indigenous, with traditional systems of government, and a main 
city that serves as a symbol of modernity and where the power of the State and money are concentrated. 
 
 
2. From One Guerrilla to Another 
 
When we talk about insurgency in Mexico, the state of Guerrero is commonplace. In national history, 
from independence onwards, Guerrero has been a permanent stage for war. As the origin of numerous social 
upheavals, it has become the epicenter of the armed struggle, as if the guerrillas were part of the state's 
geography and the name of Guerrero—which means warrior—a predestination. However, the recurrence of 
the armed movements there is explained by two historical factors: first, by persistent conditions of poverty 
that affect the majority of the population; and second, by a deeply unequal social order that begets and is 
nurtured by these same conditions. To reproduce, this social order has had to adopt forms of government 
whose power bears the stamp of authoritarianism. In this sense, rebellions have often been violent because 
the rule they face is itself violent. In the deep south of Mexico that Armando Bartra describes (2000: 16-17), 
"the one who hits, commands, and the one who commands must hit [...] Those who rule by force, by force 
fight for power, and when the subordinates decide to shake off this clumsy mandate, they almost always end 
up appealing themselves to force: the social key par excellence in an order based on fear and violence.” 
Both due to the conditions of misery that prevail and the violence with which political power is exercised, 
there are plenty of reasons for the people of Guerrero to challenge the Mexican State. "Many have invited 
them to organize and rise up in arms against the system and, in most cases, they have listened to them 
attentively because they live in their own flesh the misery spoken of by those who suggest the armed path" 
(Barrera and Sarmiento 2006: 705). However, in the social history of Guerrero, taking up arms has rarely 
been the first option, but rather a last resort. Thus, the uprising of armed movements has always been 
preceded by civic and peaceful mobilizations whose social demands have failed to be met due to the closure 
of institutional channels and the neglect of governments.  
This is the paradigmatic case of the guerrillas of the 1970s, which arose as a result of a civic movement 
that sought the democratization of the political system, but instead suffered electoral fraud—in the 1962 
elections—and ended up becoming more radical in the face of increasing repression after several massacres: 
in Chilpancingo in 1960, Iguala in 1962, Acapulco and Atoyac in 1967. It is in reaction to these that two 
guerrilla organizations were created by Lucio Cabañas and Genaro Vázquez, two teachers made guerrilleros 








organization’s peaceful civility in the early 1970s stifles the opposition’s electoral belligerence [...] and 
angers the democratic rebellion, which will soon become armed." It is against both guerrillas that the so-
called Dirty War was developed (Herrera and Cedillo 2012), through a massive military deployment, a 
scorched earth policy and a systematic use of torture and enforced disappearance. If this war achieved its 
main objective, the physical destruction of both guerrillas, in no way did it mean the elimination of the 
structural causes that had given rise to the rebellion. 
In consequence, the guerrillas returned to public light in the mid-1990s, after the Aguas Blancas massacre, 
with the uprising of the People's Revolutionary Army—Ejército del Pueblo Revolucionario (EPR). While it 
is true that this army is not the direct continuation of the guerrillas of the 1970s, it is also true that the EPR is 
nourished by this historical experience, works according to inherited schemes and, therefore, "represents a 
type of guerrilla that does not succeed in overcoming the limitations of their previous expressions” (Barrera 
and Sarmiento 2006: 693). The history of the EPR is that of a common front made up of diverse small armed 
groups which momentarily converged in the only major military campaign that the guerrilla managed to 
carry out, between late 1996 and mid-1997—in various Mexican states. Despite this initial projection, it soon 
became clear that Guerrero continued to occupy a central position, since it was there that the EPR was first 
made known and where it was estimated that more than half of its columns were concentrated (Gutiérrez 
1998: 305). 
After the offensive, the diaspora began. Dogmatism, strategic divergence, and internal struggles 
fragmented the EPR into numerous divisions. "New identities and denominations have been progressively 
formed, acknowledging the EPR movement as the original, common core" (Lofredo 2007b: 51). The first 
great schism occurred in 1998 with the detachment of the Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People—
Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Insurgente (ERPI). After this, the acronyms multiplied at the rhythm of 
the press releases. Between 1996 and 2013, the guerrilla groups announced in Guerrero added a total of 
approximately 26 different acronyms, coined especially in the years immediately following the public 
emergence of the EPR. However, only a minority of these names have taken military actions that have a 
press record, while most of the initials have left nothing more than a written proclamation or a fleeting 
appearance. Of these, little or nothing has been known again, giving rise to a "nebula”—to borrow the 
expression used by Jorge Lofredo. 
The organizational fragmentation of the EPR movement is also clear in its geographical dispersion. 
Between 1996 and 2013, press monitoring efforts—including mine—indicated the presence of guerrilla 
groups in at least 32 municipalities of Guerrero, more due to armed propaganda activities than to military 
actions (Map 1). This presence was concentrated on both coasts of the state—Costa Grande and Costa Chica, 
separated by the Acapulco bay—but it was also found in some points of other regions, between areas of 
influence of the EPR [red], the ERPI [yellow], both [orange] and a third group (FARP) [violet]. 
Guerrero is a scene overcrowded with armed movements, so the degree of fragmentation of the EPR 
movement is so high that it is extremely difficult to distinguish between genuine guerrillas and other groups, 
which instead respond to power interests, be they paramilitary or criminal. Now, the gray area in which the 
guerrillas move, "despite the doubts and suspicions that the armed groups and their real intentions arouse, the 
issue is no less important; rather, there should be further analysis and understanding of both the Mexican 






 I recognize that the EPR movement represents a big research challenge. First, because studies on contemporary forms of 
guerrilla in Guerrero are scarce, unlike their predecessors from the 1960s and 1970s, much more studied because of the Dirty 








Map 1. Guerrilla presence in municipalities of Guerrero with a press record (1996-2013) 
Sources: Gutiérrez 1998, Sánchez Valdés 2015 
 
With the guerrilla revival, the militarization policies have been reactivated for implementing a 
counterinsurgency that had been tried in the Dirty War and that is now reinventing itself in Chiapas in the 
face of the Zapatista uprising. Among others, a good example of this is the arrival of Luis Humberto López 
Portillo Leal to the command of the IX Military Region—corresponding to the state of Guerrero. He is the 
same military chief accused of ordering executions during the battle of Ocosingo—in Chiapas—against the 
Zapatist Army. He was trained in the fight against Lucio Cabañas in the 1970s (Gutiérrez 1998: 281). By the 
end of 1999, the Pie de la Cuesta Air Base, the Icacos Naval Base—both in Acapulco—and the seven pre-
existing infantry battalions based in Guerrero had been joined by three more battalions and a headquarters of 
special forces. Likewise, "in 1997 the federal deputies of the Defense Commission estimated the number of 
soldiers in Guerrero at 23,000, while the EPR stated that there were 45,000" (Gutiérrez 2000: 93).  
The massive deployment of troops, which seeks the physical occupation of the field, repeats the basic 
schemes of the Dirty War, because, as Carlos Montemayor (2007: 34) explains, “the peasant and indigenous 
guerrilla grows under the complicit silence of an entire region […] The armed or military-prepared groups 
are but the tip of the iceberg. The extensive and complex family ties penetrate villages and ranches with a 
communication system that the Army is unable to decipher or anticipate without resorting to indiscriminate 
devastation. This indigenous and peasant support for the guerrilla is the circuit that the armies intend to 
deactivate.” To do this, roads, hills and parcels are turned into small battlefields where the peasants 
constantly find themselves facing military checkpoints, soldiers' pickets or improvised camps. In these 
places, abuses of power and human rights violations are committed. Security forces become risk factors.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
ethnography on the subject. Consequently, the few results that I present are still partial and can only be an invitation for future 








Additionally, in indigenous municipalities such as Ayutla, the effects of loss of legitimacy are exacerbated 
by the cultural and social distance that separates the soldiers from the indigenous peasants, who carry the 
stigmas built against them. Conversely, for the latter, the troops generate mistrust as they embody the 
mestizo power of an urban world that rejects them and a State that oppresses them. It is for these reasons that 
the guerrillas have found roots in a municipality like Ayutla. Their area of influence is particularly strong 
among the municipality’s indigenous communities—as confirmed by all the interviews in which the subject 
was discussed. The main reasons for this presence, according to my informants, are the conditions of extreme 
poverty and the multiple injustices of which indigenous people are victims. In the face of governmental 
omission and political violence, some people see “no other way” (Goodwin, 2001) to improve these 
conditions than to resort to armed struggle. Despite the cost that their participation in the guerrilla can 
represent, it is a way that communities have found to defend themselves against abuses and, at the same time, 
to try to provoke some kind of political change. 
 
 
3. June 7, 1998: The Charco Massacre 
 
In the contemporary history of Guerrero, each guerrilla cycle, both in the 60s and the 90s, is associated 
with various massacres.
3
 In the mid-1990s, the guerrilla rebirth coincided with the Aguas Blancas massacre 
and culminated with the Charco massacre. The first allowed the convergence of the EPR, while the second 
showed its fragmentation. Completed in late 1997, the split of the ERPI is seen as the great schism of the 
EPR movement, since it undoubtedly represented the most important part of the Guerrero cadres, particularly 
on the coast, and corresponded more or less with the state committee of the EPR (Lofredo 2007b: 51). The 
ERPI stands out for its insurgency strategies. It promotes the role of the support bases in decision-making 
processes, which has led it to establish stable relations with unarmed social sectors and non-clandestine 
organizations. In this sense, the ERPI shows a certain closeness to the Zapatist movement. 
This new guerrilla came to light due to the massacre that occurred in the Mixtec village of El Charco, in 
Ayutla, on June 7, 1998. On the previous day, a meeting was called by traditional authorities for the 
management of productive projects. It was attended by inhabitants of the village, as well as by visitors from 
localities of the area, mostly Mixtec men. Towards the end of the afternoon, a column of the ERPI joined the 
meeting to proselytize the attendees. "Then they spent time with the peasants. Some of them spoke in Mixtec 
language […] At around 10 p.m., the community’s inhabitants retired to sleep at their homes, and the 
guerrilleros and visiting peasants stayed inside the village primary school” (Gutiérrez 1998: 296). In some 
way or another, information about the meeting reached the Mexican Army, whose 78th Infantry Battalion 
deployed a spectacular operation, along with local police, to reach the village the next morning, and surprise 
those who were spending the night in the two classrooms of the primary school (CNDH 2000). The assault 
occurred at dawn. 11 people were killed, five others were injured and 22 were detained and taken to the IX 
Military Region Headquarters in Acapulco, where they were systematically tortured. Of the 11 dead, 10 were 
 
3
 These massacres, although they undoubtedly contribute to the radicalization of the political struggle and the possibility of 
taking up arms, do not in themselves explain the existence of armed movements, or the emergence of guerrillas. In this sense, 
in the same way that there can be conflict without mobilization, critical episodes of repression can occur without necessarily 
triggering a social response, because the threat they produce manages to inhibit it. In Guerrero, while every guerrilla uprising 









from the Mixtec zone of the municipality. Among them, the ERPI recognized four of its members. The only 
statement of the guerrilla about what happened says the following:  
  
At the village school, seven unarmed civilians and four revolutionary fighters were murdered […] The 
official version that states it was a casual meeting during a routine tour is absurd […] The federal army put 
a tactical fence around the village […] Our unit chose to leave the classrooms to take the combat away 
from the school and avoid a larger massacre […] The two fighters who resisted until the end, Oscar and 
Elías, and two more civilians, were executed at great speed and at short range on the school court. They 
had surrendered and were unarmed. The 11 bodies that the Army presented as a result of a confrontation 
actually correspond to one combatant killed in combat, a volunteer visitor killed in combat, two temporary 
or dispersed combatants executed when surrendered and unarmed, and seven peasants killed when they 
were totally defenseless (five in the classrooms and two more on the court). The wounded are all civilians 
[who] were also unarmed. (ERPI 1998)  
 
According to the “Tlachinollan” Mountain Human Rights Center—with an office in Ayutla—from now 
on, the municipality is “under the gaze of police and military authorities. Policies […] are drafted according 
to the script of the counterinsurgency war. The recommendation of the generals and the police inform the 
content of policies that the state executive power and the municipal government must adopt” (Tlachinollan 
2011: 86). After El Charco, the municipality was militarized, increasing both military operations and 
grievances to the civilian population. Thus, between 1998 and 2004, a total of 16 cases of human rights 
violations by the army were registered in seven different villages of Ayutla, always against indigenous 
communities and individuals (Tlachinollan 2004). One of these cases corresponds to a forced sterilization 
campaign, implemented in 1998 by the local Ministry of Health, through which 32 indigenous men were 
sterilized. In those years, several cases of indigenous women raped by soldiers were also reported, as is the 
case of Inés Fernández and Valentina Rosendo (Amnesty International 2004).  
However, the implementation of counterinsurgency measures has not only meant the exercise of external 
violence on communities, but also an active promotion of paramilitary activities through the recruitment of 
individuals and groups who enter the army service in their irregular warfare against the guerrillas. “This is 
precisely what has happened in Ayutla. In many of the communities, the army has embedded itself in the 
social fabric, linking up with caciques, businessmen, or local groups” (Orraca 2012: 114). Taking advantage 
of internal divisions and pre-existing conflicts, paramilitarism has allowed the cohesion of the guerrilla base 
communities to be fragmented, even dividing them into two clearly opposite groups. It has also been an ideal 




4. From the Guerrilla to the Community Police 
 
The contemporary evolution of the armed movements in Guerrero has gone through profound processes of 
transformation and reconfiguration driven by a dual need: on the one hand, to overcome the strategic failure 
of insurrectional focus, the stagnant Leninism that supports it and the fragmentation that has derived from its 
sectarian dogmatism; and on the other, to adapt to the structural changes of the political frameworks 
introduced by the neoliberal leaning of successive federal governments, especially from the 1990s onwards. 








alternative in the field of armed movements: it is the Community Police, created in 1995 in the Costa-
Montaña region and consolidated in 1998 as the Regional Coordination of Community Authorities—
Coordinadora Regional de Autoridades Comunitarias (CRAC).  
The Community Police is born as a collective and self-managed response of some indigenous villages to 
crime, police corruption and judicial impunity. In the CRAC system, policemen are elected in a general 
assembly of the village and provide unpaid service for one year. The system allows the different police 
groups to coordinate. Important decisions and the appointment of the governing bodies are agreed in a 
Regional Assembly. At the same time, the CRAC is created to prosecute prisoners, due to judicial impunity. 
Detained individuals are judged by the community authorities—often in their own language—in accordance 
with the principles of local normative systems. In addition, it is worth mentioning that, if found guilty, 
prisoners go through a re-education process that involves compensation for the damages and effective 
reintegration into community life, by carrying out work of collective interest on an itinerant basis. This is 
how the CRAC system begins to function, in fact, around a House of Justice that has its historical 
headquarters in San Luis Acatlán (a neighboring municipality of Ayutla). Since its first years of life, this 
system has known undeniable success, characterized by its effectiveness in preventing and reducing crime, 
the accessibility of its justice, and the usefulness of its re-education process. Consequently, the number of 
localities that have sought to join the CRAC, from other municipalities and regions, has been constantly 
increasing. Finally, it is important to note that, due to this growth, it was decided in 2007 to divide the 
system into several jurisdictions, through the creation of other Houses of Justice.
4
  
Although certain features are common to the history of the guerrilla and the Community Police, such as 
the general conditions of misery, marginalization and injustice that make it a necessity to gain rights by 
taking up arms, the organizational traditions in which both sides are framed present two different 
genealogies. Schematically, the guerrilla—based on the model of the Cuban Revolution—comes from a 
tradition of the peasantry as a class, has a military structure and seeks to transform the dominant political 
system, while the Community Police draws on the organizational matrix of indigenous peoples, is sustained 
by community systems of government, and represents the construction of collective responses to the 
problems that affect village life. Likewise, these are two sides of an armed struggle that faces two different 
versions of the Mexican state: for the guerrillas, since the 1960s, a strong post-revolutionary State that must 
be challenged; for the Community Police, since the 1990s, a weakened neoliberal State that must be 
replaced. On the one hand, it is about changing a State that damages society; on the other, about rebuilding a 
society damaged by the collapse of the State. The care of life in society is displacing the demand for seizing 
power. 
The gradual weakening of the guerrilla path that the EPR movement had embodied coincides and contrasts 





 There is abundant Mexican literature on the Community Police in Guerrero. For further developments, one of the main 
specialists, María Teresa Sierra (2008, 2010), has published several texts in English.   
5
 Community defense is an analytical proposal that I take from the work of Fuentes and Fini (2018) to explain the armed 
movements in southern contemporary Mexico, entering into debate with the dominant categories of "armed civilians", 
"vigilantes" or "non-state armed groups", because these are used to encompass experiences so different that they prevent 
capturing the specificity of defense in an insecure environment and, second, because the characterization of non-state can 
become ambiguous and complicate its understanding when these defensive groups are related, formally or informally, to the 
State. In effect, as an expression of the traditional governments, like them, community defense bodies exist between law and 
custom. Their relationship with the State should not be read in Manichean terms—and thus be seen in continuity with the 








that is to say, the formation of defensive armed forces, established on a grassroots organizational basis and 
with the goal of guaranteeing the security of the localities. In Mexico, however, community defense is not 
new in itself, but represents the updating of a historical constant, inherited from the Mexican Revolution, 
with antecedents in the rural peasant guards, as well as in the police corps of indigenous communities. In this 
sense, if in their conflictive history the people of Guerrero have had to resort to arms, they did it more to 
defend themselves against abuse and injustice than to attack the forces of an order that oppresses them. It has 
been more in self-defense against bandits and caciques than in offense against the government. Even in the 
case of the guerrillas, it has been more to defend themselves against abuses than to seize power.  
The crisis of insecurity at the beginning of the twenty-first century reactivated the latent nature of this 
organizational tradition. New armed groups emerged—after the pioneering CRAC. Therefore, the new 
defense strategy seeks, in first instance, to respond to the generalized crisis of violence that has characterized 
neoliberal governance in Mexico in times of the “war on drugs”, and that has been exercised with singular 
harshness in the deep south of the country. There, starting in the second half of the 2000s, the levels of 
violent crime and homicides increased dramatically. In Ayutla, the rate of the latter has been systematically 
higher than the state average, making it the most violent municipality in the entire Costa Chica region from 
2006 to 2011 uninterruptedly. The levels were much higher than those of the neighboring municipalities, and 
proportionally greater in that period than those of Acapulco, epicenter of criminal violence in Guerrero. For 
the year 2009 alone, the municipal rate reached the record level of 153 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, 
which placed Ayutla among the 100 most violent municipalities in the country (Resa, 2013).  
In this climate of heightened violence, Lorenzo, brother of Inés Fernández—one of the indigenous women 
raped by soldiers in 2002—was tortured and killed in February 2008. In April of the same year, five 
members of the local Tlapanec organization were arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned (Amnesty International 
2010). Among them was the legal representative of the male victims of forced sterilization. In the following 
year, in 2009, Raúl Lucas and Manuel Ponce, president and secretary of the local Mixtec organization 
respectively, were disappeared, tortured, and murdered. These actions sought to break up the organizational 
processes of the indigenous communities in Ayutla. “The extrajudicial execution of the Mixtec leaders was a 
duly planned crime against humanity; the orchestrators coldly calculated the impacts that this execrable 
event would have on their organization. The damages were not only individual or familial but collective” 
(Tlachinollan 2009: 35). 
 
 
5. A House of Justice in El Paraíso 
 
Given the gravity of the situation, the localities of Ayutla needed to ensure their safety. Thus, traditional 
authorities were increasingly interested in the CRAC experience in the neighboring municipality of San Luis 
Acatlán. There were several approaches and attempts at dialogue with this organization, particularly in 2008 
and 2009, but "the murders of Raúl Lucas and Manuel Ponce [...] caused the temporary suspension of the 
process" (Nicasio 2014: 278). Starting in 2011, another Mixtec leader, Arturo Campos, resumed his 
promotional work for the organization of police groups through a consultation campaign in the indigenous 
villages. However, in those years the existence of internal conflicts in the CRAC started to become more 
evident, covered in the media for the struggle of its leaders, amid the dilemmas created by the need for the 
organization to adapt to the challenges posed by the scenario of drug war policies (Fini 2019). In a way, the 









several of its founders, seduced by academics and politicians, went from forum to forum explaining their 
successful justice system. On more than a few occasions, the CRAC served to catapult politicians to public 
office, and other times the leaders themselves were tempted to do so […] What was once a community 
service became a space of fetishized power. In this way, the coordinators gradually abandoned the work of 
security, justice and re-education, and they neglected to strengthen the cargo system
6
 […] This was 
aggravated by the creation of other Houses of Justice that were unaware of the CRAC process 
(Tlachinollan 2014: 132-133).  
 
The process of dialogue between the Ayutla communities and the CRAC gained strength in 2012, not only 
as a result of the leadership of Arturo Campos, but also due to the consolidation in the municipality of 
another recently created organization: the Union of Peoples and Organizations of the State of Guerrero—
Unión de Pueblos y Organizaciones del Estado de Guerrero (UPOEG). Although this organization’s agenda 
is aimed more towards the management of local development projects, the origin of its founders is of crucial 
importance: they have played an active role in the history of the CRAC and so have extensive community 
organization experience in matters of security. Therefore, it is this coincidence of organizational processes, 
together with the confluence of collective demands for security on the one hand, and the concurrence of 
social leadership with a strong militant capital on the other, which in Ayutla allowed "the UPOEG to 
promote the formation of a community police in the southeast of the municipality simultaneously to the 
management of productive projects, social demands and political participation” (Hernández 2014: 192). In 
this way, in October 2012, during the Community Police’s XVII Anniversary, the public presentation of the 
police groups of 27 Ayutla localities was organized for their formal incorporation into the CRAC system, 
thus forming the basis for the foundation of a new House of Justice. It was finally created on December 22 
based on a decision of the representatives of the other Houses of Justice. The new House was established in 
the village of El Paraíso, in Ayutla, a few kilometers from El Charco. 
The foundation of this House of Justice is part of a critical juncture, marked by the teachers’ movement 
against a federal educational reform and by the emergence of a series of community defense organizations 
throughout Guerrero. At the beginning of 2013, an armed uprising of civil self-defense groups took place in 
Ayutla, which in the following weeks spread to the neighboring municipalities, integrating a Citizen Police 
system—based on the CRAC—under the auspices of the UPOEG. Likewise, between the end of 2012 and 
the beginning of 2013, community defense movements were taking place in other regions of Guerrero. This 
is the case of La Cañada, where the inhabitants of the cities of Huamuxtitlán and Olinalá instituted their own 
security forces (Ortiz and Torres 2018). This is also the case of Tixtla, a municipality in the Center region—
neighboring the state capital, Chilpancingo—where a community defense was organized by various villages 
and urban neighborhoods (Gatica 2018).  
Despite the internal conflict that was weakening it, outwards "the CRAC shines as an alternative of justice 
and security with community roots [...] It is not surprising, therefore, that indigenous and rural localities have 
 
6
 In various regions of Guerrero, the community governments are structured based on what classical Mesoamericanist 
anthropology conceptualized as the “cargo system.” The system is an institutional set of political practices based on an 
imperative of service to the community, understood as a citizen duty to which all adult or married people in the locality are 
subject. In turn, the provision of community service is articulated with a hierarchy of positions with specific functions, which 
everyone must fill throughout their life in an alternating and ascending manner. This principle of community service, then, 
refers to the fulfillment of assignments by individuals designated for this purpose, whose tasks are indicated by law and 
custom. On the cargo system in Mesoamerica, see the anthology organized by Korsbaek (1996) with classic texts like those of 








looked to the CRAC model when facing violence and insecurity in the midst of State negligence” 
(Tlachinollan 2013: 32). In addition to the legal recognition of the CRAC in 2011 by a local law, more and 
more localities were seeking to join the organization. Most of the new community defense movements 
requested their incorporation. In early 2013, police groups from the Tixtla and Tecoanapa municipalities 
joined the CRAC system, followed in March by those from Olinalá and, in June, those from Huamuxtitlán 
and Tlatlauquitepec. In turn, all these new additions became part of the El Paraíso House of Justice.  
 
 
6. August 21, 2013: The Assault on El Paraíso  
 
Due to this series of additions, the recently inaugurated House of Justice in El Paraíso soon faced serious 
challenges. The first of these was operational in nature and stemmed from the jurisdiction’s high degree of 
geographic dispersion, whose disorderly growth was not based on practical criteria but on political ones. The 
main result was the difficulty of organizing discontinuous and distant zones [yellow] from El Paraíso in 
Ayutla [star] and, at the same time, of coordinating them with the San Luis Acatlán House of Justice 
[triangle], the other Houses of the historical region of the Community Police [blue] and new municipalities in 
the process of incorporation [green] (Map 2). The operational complications of this dispersion were 
numerous. In fact, holding assemblies for decision-making, carrying out police actions and transferring 
prisoners was extremely difficult. 
 
Map 2. Municipalities of Guerrero with CRAC presence in mid-2013 









Furthermore, the multiplicity of incorporated areas entails a second difficulty, cultural in nature, due to the 
diversity of local contexts, the difference in political histories and the heterogeneity of organizational 
dynamics. Both in rural and urban environments, with mixed and not necessarily indigenous identities, the 
community service that sustains the traditional governments was practiced in partial and differentiated ways. 
In short, the haste of an accelerated and heated process of incorporation into the CRAC system overflowed 
the internal channels of regulation and ended "without respect for a set of practices and operating rules that 
tend to subsume control of the process to community-type instances, such as local or regional assemblies 
[…] These dynamics generated anomalies in the process of incorporating new communities” (Fini 2019: 66). 
Added to the above, the fact that the new House of Justice was immersed within the struggles that 
structured the CRAC internal conflict turned it into an object of dispute for the warring factions. In effect, 
the creation of the El Paraíso House of Justice preceded the crisis that led to the organization's internal 
elections in February 2013, with Eliseo Villar being elected as one of the new coordinators of the main 
House of Justice in San Luis Acatlán. From there, the relationship between the leaderships of both Houses—
the one in El Paraíso and the one in San Luis—was characterized by increasing tensions caused by a series of 
disagreements. In the following months, reciprocal complaints began to circulate within the CRAC, the first 
House accusing the second of authoritarianism and corruption, and the second accusing the first of 
politicization and radicalism. In this sense, “the El Paraíso House of Justice was formed on the go, with its 
own style of acting that was described by the San Luis Acatlán CRAC as ‘autonomous,’ and should be 
understood as a product of the convulsive socio-political process that Ayutla has undergone” (Nicasio 2014: 
280). 
Meanwhile, in Olinalá, the Community Police group attached to El Paraíso and headed by its commander, 
Nestora Salgado, fought the criminal group that operated in said municipality with the complicity of the city 
council (López 2019). The result of this struggle was the flagrant capture of an important leader, a member 
of the local ruling class, who was transferred to El Paraíso. For its part, in Tixtla, the new Community Police 
group faced the political-criminal nexus that united the local delinquency and the municipal government, in 
addition to the geographical isolation that characterized it in relation to the rest of the CRAC system. To do 
this, it took direct actions and engaged with other social sectors, like the mobilized teachers and students 
from the neighboring Ayotzinapa Normal School. Finally, also in Ayutla, CRAC sectors, UPOEG groups 
and the teachers’ union converged. 
As a result of the confluence of these organizational processes, the new House of Justice began to 
mobilize on the offense against the state government, which is uncharacteristic of the CRAC political 
tradition, but not without recalling a style more appropriate to the guerrilla model. Immersed from its 
beginnings within a critical juncture and a highly conflictive general dynamic, both outward and inward, the 
police groups attached to El Paraíso took actions together with the teachers’ movement, participating in 
several demonstrations. This process of unity culminated in April 2013 with the symbolic but spectacular 
entry of an armed contingent of Community Police to the state capital, Chilpancingo, bypassing a military 
checkpoint under the protection of the mobilized teachers. With this action, together with the arrest of the 
politician from Olinalá, the elements for a new act of repression were in place. Given that year’s contentious 
situation, however, various preparations were required before it could be carried out. 
The first government response occurred with the local deployment of military troops, immediately after 
the different local armed uprisings—particularly in Ayutla, Tecoanapa and Olinalá—with systematic actions 
of harassment and disarmament. However, sometimes in a contradictory way, at the same time the state 
government granted subsidies, support, and various equipment—including weapons—in favor of the CRAC. 
Following Governor Ángel Aguirre’s visit to San Luis Acatlán in May, the coordinator of the main House of 








government that in exchange reinforced its subsidy policy to the CRAC, for the particular benefit of its 
leadership. With the partial and discretionary redistribution of this money, in turn, it was possible to corrupt 
important sectors of the CRAC system, extending its client network under a logic of power. The growing 
authoritarianism of San Luis Acatlán over the other Houses of Justice ended up precipitating the conflict 
with the last established House. On August 9, lending himself to the official intrigue, Eliseo Villar publicly 
declared the unilateral "expulsion" of El Paraíso, leaving unprotected all the police groups assigned to this 
House of Justice, without organizational support or legal protection. 
A few days later, on August 21, a large-scale military operation was carried out, coordinated at the federal 
level, and deployed simultaneously on three fronts. In Ayutla, a convoy from the 48th Infantry Battalion 
arrived in El Paraíso accompanied by some marines and policemen who sacked the House of Justice’s office, 
destroying the judicial files, and released the prisoners who were at the time in the process of re-education—
including, of course, the local politician. A total of 13 CRAC policemen were detained, transferred to 
Acapulco, and systematically tortured there, with the participation of some released prisoners (CNDH 2016). 
At the same time, in the municipality of Atlixtac, military and Federal Police elements reached 
Tlatlauquitepec, releasing three accused persons and arresting four more CRAC policemen. Likewise, in 
Olinalá Nestora Salgado, one of the more emblematic social figures in Guerrero, was arrested.
7
 Finally, in 
the days before and after the military operation, arrest warrants were issued against several members of the 
Community Police, including all those arrested on the 21st. Among the latter is one of the coordinators of the 
El Paraíso House of Justice, Bernardino García, a member of the local Mixtec organization in Ayutla and a 
survivor of the Charco massacre. 
 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
The historical comparison between the two episodes of repression, which occurred in El Charco in 1998 
and El Paraíso in 2013, shows the following result: while the field of armed movements has undergone 
profound transformations, reflected in a general shift from guerrilla to community defense, the 
counterinsurgency policies against both forms presents more continuities than ruptures. Indeed, if there are 
any changes in the government response to the armed movement—perhaps the most notable of which is a 
policy of subsidies destined for leadership cooptation—they seem relatively minor, especially if they are 
contrasted with the reproduction of patterns and practices among the State security forces. The main reason 
why this repression has remained relatively stable lies in the maintenance of local forms of government, 
beyond the changes that have occurred in the national political system. Despite the openness to 
multipartyism in the 2000s and the end of the single-party regime, an authoritarian way of exercising power, 
 
7
 In 2018, Nestora Salgado was elected senator by the political party of the current Mexican President, Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador (MORENA). Although the election of this new government transcends the time limit of this research work, it can be 
said, in general terms, that the federal government's strategy of favoring negotiation in its interaction with protest movements 
has generated a political environment relatively hostile to repression. However, it is striking how this same government has 
ostensibly ignored the Community Police and other social organizations—which are not usually considered legitimate 
interlocutors or included in the new policies—simply because they are armed. In Guerrero in particular, the evolution of 
armed movements and repression, in the coming years, will largely depend on the outcome of the transitional justice process 








known as caciquismo, has been reproduced in Guerrero—as in other regions of Mexico—as a form of 
subnational authoritarianism (Gibson 2012).
8
  
Despite the 15-year gap that separates the two events, both are characterized by a disproportionate use of 
force and the organization of special intervention operations, under military leadership. These elements are 
symptomatic of constant human rights violations, not only of those detained but of the civilian population in 
general, combined with the equally systematic ignorance of the collective rights of indigenous peoples. In 
southern Mexico, militarization has historically been the main response of the State to armed movements 
(Oikión 2007), whose strategy lies in criminalizing protests and judicializing social organization as if they 
were outlaws. In this sense, what makes clear the continuity of the counterinsurgency is, first of all, the 
domination of a militarist paradigm whose binary schemes equate every armed movement with a guerilla, 
understood as a regular army capable of advancing into positions and capturing places, when in reality they 
are not. In Guerrero, the guerrilla has only the name of an insurgent army because “it cannot leave its region. 
It can grow, expand its strength in the region itself […] but such growth will not, in principle, extend it 
outside those boundaries” (Montemayor 2007: 15). Besides, the military approach minimizes the 
sociological causality of the armed movements, reducing them to the core of its leadership, whose support 
cannot come only from popular solidarity, but also from an external source of resources, a kind of hidden 
power that would have to be revealed—such as drug trafficking in the case of Guerrero. 
What illustrates the consistency of the counterinsurgency is, second, the levels of fear, paranoia and 
visceral anti-communism that usually characterize the government vision of the armed movements, 
particularly in Mexico. In this sense, in the 1990s, the EPR was perceived as the ghost of the Zapatism 
movement beyond Chiapas. In the following decades, despite the transition from offensive to defensive 
forms, the armed movements have been perceived as no less harmful by government circles. The Community 
Police of today continues to represent the guerrilla danger of yesterday. This explains the continuity of a 
counterinsurgency that seems to affect in a differentiated way the defensive forms of social organization, 
which, as expressions of an evolutionary adaptation to repression, have shown to have a certain capacity for 
resilience. Thus, despite the assault it had suffered five years earlier, at the end of 2018, the El Paraíso House 
of Justice was still operating, providing security and justice. In October of that year, the Community Police 
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